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COMMENTS

THE PRICE OF PRIVILEGE:
IS VIRGINIA'S BAN ON MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS'
PARTICIPATION IN CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS REALLY
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD?

Mary Wilkins Hunt*
I. INTRODUCTION

In child custody determinations, which are "the most challenging area of
family law for both practitioners and judges, parties are more likely to be
inflexible and compromises more difficult to attain." 1 In custody cases, it is
not just a monetary interest on the line but rather a child. 2 These factors
lead to difficulties in reaching agreements. When the parties cannot reach
an agreement on their own, these very difficult decisions are left in the
hands of judges. In determining child custody, numerous factors are taken
into consideration that vary by jurisdiction and can lead the judge into a
quagmire of issues that are not necessarily legal in nature. Since 2003,
Virginia has not allowed a judge to take into consideration in custody
decisions a mental healthcare professional's testimony. 3 The 2008 Virginia
General Assembly has rectified this grave error in family law by repealing
the 2003 ban. 4 A judge is charged with the task of making a custody

- J.D.

Candidate, 2008, University of Richmond: T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., 2001, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FORMS §
15:1, at 1051 (Thomson West 2008).
2. See id.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
4. S.B. 330, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
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determination that is in the "best interests of the child,"' 5 but can an accurate
assessment be made with incomplete information? Additionally, to comply
with the statutory law of Virginia a judge must take into consideration a
parent's physical and mental capabilities when making custody
determinations. 6 However, due to the ban on therapist testimony, a judge is
left to piece together the mental capabilities of the parents without the
benefit of the input of mental health professionals.
This article examines the national treatment of mental health care
professionals' participation in custody determinations and compares these
practices with Virginia's ban. Furthermore, this article explores the
rationale behind the ban on therapist testimony while weighing the pros and
cons of allowing such evidence to be used. It then takes a closer look at the
arguments for repealing the ban and the possible benefits which could result
from the 2008 repeal.

ii.
NATIONAL TREATMENT OF THERAPIST TESTIMONY IN CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) sets forth national standards in child custody law. 7 The scope of
the UCCJEA encompasses most child custody issues that arise. 8 In custody
determinations, a judge is called on to make "assessments of the respective
parents' fitness and their competence to be custodians of their children-a
right and privilege that is rarely questioned outside the context of such
proceedings." 9 The national standard used in making child custody
determinations requires the court to make a decision that is in the "best
interests of the child." 10 The exact meaning of the best interests of the child
standard and its application varies from state to state. 11 Some states provide

heavy-handed guidance enumerating specific statutory factors that a judge
must take into consideration, 12 while others only offer vague parameters for
the standard's application and leave the bulk of the decision to the judge's
discretion. 13 The Arkansas statute is an example of a vague statute that
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
Id. at § 20-124.3(3).
See SWISHERET AL., supranote 1, § 15:5, at 1067.
See id. at 1069.
Id.at § 15:1, at 1052.

10. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 11.03, at 460 (LexisNexis 3d ed.

2005); see, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
11. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 10, § 11.03, at 460.
12. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.17 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008).
13. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
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merely requires the custody determination "shall be made without regard to
the sex of the parent but solely in accordance with the welfare and best
interests of the children." 14 The Arkansas statute and others like it have
faced criticism for leaving much to the discretion of the judge due to a lack
of specificity in defining the best interests of the child. 15
Other states' statutes are much more detailed in setting forth the
guidelines the court should take into consideration in defining the best
interests of the child. 16 An example of a more detail-oriented statute is
Minnesota's, which lays out a specific list of factors the court must take
into consideration. 17 The Minnesota statute also prohibits the use of "one
factor to the exclusion of all others... and requires detailed findings on each
factor and an explanation of how the factors led to the court's best interests

determination." 18 The judge, however, is not required to specify the
amount of weight given to each factor, just to take all factors into
consideration in making the decision. 19 In some states with more specific
enumerations of factors, parental conduct is explicitly stated as a factor to
be considered. 20 For example, the Minnesota statute explicitly requires
courts to take parental conduct into consideration; however, there is a
limitation stating "[t]he court shall not consider the conduct of a proposed
'2 1
custodian that does not affect the custodian's relationship to the child.
Courts have found a wide variety of parental behaviors that affect the
parental relationship with the child to be relevant in custody
determinations.22

The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides a list of various factors
a court shall take under advisement in making child custody determinations

14. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 10, § 11.03, at 460 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie
1987)); see also ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (Lexis Nexis Repl. Vol. 1998 & Supp. 2007) (providing that on
divorce the court may give custody of the children of the marriage "to either father or mother, as may
seem right and proper, having regard to the moral character and prudence of the parents and the age and
sex of the children.").
15. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 10, § 11.03, at 461; SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:1, at
1053.
16. GREGORYETAL., supra note 10, § 11.03, at460.
17. Id. at 460-61 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1990).
18. Id.at 461, n. 123.
19. Id. at 460-61, 461 n. 23.
20. Id. at 467.
21. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1990)).
22. Among these factors are the sexuality of the parent, see Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 727, 324 S.E.2d
691, 694 (Va. 1985), the parent's ability to prioritize the children over their work schedule, see Peple v.
Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 423, 364 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Va. Ct. App. 1988), and the parent's ability to foster a
healthy relationship with the other parent, see Etter v. Etter, No. 0506-97-4, 1998 WL 218204, at *1, *3
(Va. Ct. App. May 5, 1998).
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in accordance with the best interests of the child. 23 One such factor is the
"mental and physical health of all individuals involved. '24 Therefore, a
judge must take into account the mental health of the child's parents,
including the impact the parents' mental health has on their abilities to
provide for the best interests of the child. The admissibility of mental
health testimony and records is an issue of privilege that is prohibited by
most states in certain situations. 25 These state statutes were passed in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, where the
Court first recognized a privilege of confidentiality between mental health
care providers and patients. 26 The psychotherapist-patient privilege allows
a mental health practitioner "to prevent the disclosure of a confidential
communication made in the course of diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition. ' 27 However, Virginia is the only state that prohibits
evidence related to a parent's mental health in custody cases. 28 This
parental privilege created in the Virginia ban limits the judge's access to
information, and places a greater emphasis on protecting parental privacy
than on the best interests of the child. 29

I believe the better reasoned approach is to permit the admission of
therapist participation in custody determinations. This would allow for
statutory compliance while ensuring the custody determination is in keeping
with the state's "best interests of the child" standard. The court cannot be
expected to make a valid judgment in compliance with statutory
requirements with incomplete information. A judge in a child custody case,
while very capable, is still a stranger to the parties involved and needs as
much information as possible to determine what is in the best interests of
the child. In some cases, the participation of a parent's mental health care
provider might be the only way to gain access to evidence pertinent to the
mental health of a parent and that parent's ability to provide for the best
interests of the child.

23. GREGORYETAL., supra note 10, § 11.03, at477.
24. Id. (quoting UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402(5), 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998)).
25. Courtney Waits, Comment, The Use of Mental Health Records in Child Custody Proceedings, 17 J.
AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 159, 161 (2001).
26. 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996).
27. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 565 (3d. pocket ed. 2006).
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Repl Vol. 2004).
29. See id.
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III. VIRGINIA'S TREATMENT OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH
EVIDENCE IN CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION PROCEEDINGS

A. Overview
30
Virginia custody law has shifted towards being facially gender neutral.
The law no longer takes into account antiquated ideas of the father having
primary rights to the children. 3 1 Virginia law also no longer gives weight to
the "tender years presumption" that favors child custody being awarded to

the mother. 32 The rationale behind this presumption was that "[m]other
love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of women, and as a general
thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring, and
' 33
moreover, a child needs a mother's care even more than a father's.
Today, a court begins with a clean slate and looks to statutorily enumerated

factors to determine what is in the best interests of the child. 34 Virginia
case law provides guidance for the relative weight a judge should assign to

each given factor. 35 However, in the end, the determination is a balancing
act performed by the judge, within his or her discretion. As long as the

statutory factors are considered, the judge's decision will rarely be
disturbed.36

This deference to initial custody determinations is but one

30. See SWISHER ET AL., supranote 1, § 15:1, at 1052-53.
31. At one time, there was such a presumption. Id. (citing Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt) 307,
331, available at 1878 WL 5869 at *15 (Va. 1878) ("the father is the legal guardian of the infant; the
law gives it to him against all the world"); Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 806, 815-16, 6 S.E. 630, 635 (Va.
1887) ("[J]t is proper to say, by the common law, the father is the legal guardian of the infant."); Meyer
v. Meyer, 100 Va. 228, 229, 40 S.E. 1038, 1038 (Va. 1902) ("Ordinarily, the father is entitled to the care
and custody of his infant child... ")).
32. The tender years presumption was also once a part of Virginia's common law. Id. (citing Mullen v.
Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 270-71, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (Va. 1948) ("[T]he mother is the natural custodian of
her child of tender years .... ); Brooks v. Brooks, 200 Va. 530, 539, 106 S.E.2d 611, 617-18 (Va. 1959)
("Generally, where the child is of tender years and will be equally well cared for by either the mother or
father, the mother, in preference to the father, should be awarded its custody."); Moore v. Moore, 212
Va. 153, 155, 183 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1971) ("The mother is universally recognized as the natural
guardian and custodian of her children of tender years .... )). Contra Visikides v. Derr, 3 Va. App. 69,
72, 348 S.E.2d 40,42 (1986) ("Use of [the tender years presumption] in determining what is in the best
interests of the child is reversible error.").
33. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 1, § 11.03, at 461-62 (quoting Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698 (Wash.
1916)).
34. See SWISHER ET AL., supranote 1, § 15:1, at 1052-53; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3.
35. See SWISHER ET AL., supranote 1, § 15:1, at 1053.
36. See id. at 1052-53 (citing Venable v. Venable, 2 Va. App. 178, 187, 342 S.E.2d 646, 651 (Va. Ct.
App. 1986) (demonstrating that a trial court will be afforded discretion unless the decision is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it); Robinson v. Robinson, 5 Va. App. 222, 227, 361 S.E.2d 356,
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reason why it is critical for the judge to have all the information necessary
to make a well-informed decision from the beginning.
The UCCJEA was adopted by Virginia in 2001 to keep Virginia child
custody law consistent with national standards. 37 Virginia adopted the
UCCJEA to provide more uniform standards in the jurisdiction and
enforcement of child custody determinations. 38 A child custody proceeding
under the UCCJEA is "one in which legal custody, physical custody, or
visitation with respect to a child is at issue, and is inclusive of a proceeding
for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity,
termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence,
where such issues appear. ' 39 The UCCJEA considers termination of
parental rights cases in child custody proceedings, 40 and yet Virginia bans
41
mental health professionals' participation in custody determinations.
For a judge to determine what will be in the best interests of the child
between competing potential custodians, the court will "look to and
consider the qualifications and fitness of the parents, their adaptability to
the task of caring for the child, their ability to control and direct it, the age,
sex and health of the child, its temporal and moral well-being, as well as the
environment and circumstances of its proposed home, and influences likely
'42
to be exerted upon the child."
The main tenet of Virginia custody law is the same as the national
standard, which seeks to promote "the best interests of the child. ' 43 The
Virginia law lists various factors a trial courtmust consider when deciding
the best interests of the child in custody and visitation cases. 44 These
factors are not suggestions, they are mandated; therefore the court must
consider all factors. 45 Section 20-124.3 of the Virginia Code "specifies the
factors a court 'shall consider' in determining the 'best interests of a child

358-59 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that trial courts must consider the enumerated factors provided by
the General Assembly)). The factors previously set forth in VA CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 are now found in
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3, with amendments. Id., § 15.1, at 1053 n.9.
37. Id., § 15.5, at 1067.
38. Id. at 1067-68.
39. Id. at 1069.
40. See id.
41. See Va Code Ann. § 20-124.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (limiting the application of this statutory
provision to child custody & visitation cases under Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2).
42. SWISHER ET AL., supranote 1, § 15:8, at 1092 (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 203 Va. 61, 63, 122
S.E.2d 658, 660 (Va 1961)).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3; GREGORY ET AL., supranote 10, § 11.03, at 460.
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 for a full list of factors.
45. See id.; Brown v. Brown, 30 Va. App. 532, 538; 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
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for... custody or visitation."''

46

A factor of particular relevance is fitness of the parent, "a threshold
determination in every custody case."' 47 A parent in a custody case must
establish fitness, by clear and convincing evidence. 48 Factors found to be
relevant when evaluating a parent's fitness include sexual misconduct in the
form of cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, 49 adultery,5 0
homosexual conduct,5 1 and abuse allegations or findings.52 However, there
3
is case law indicating many of these are not per se evidence of unfitness.1
This seemingly conflicting case law reflects the totality of the
circumstances approach that judges use to weigh the factors that indicate a
54
parent is capable of providing for the best interests of the child.
Virginia law recognizes the psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil
actions; however, "the privilege is inapplicable 'if the physical or mental
condition of the patient is at issue in a civil action.' 55 This exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has historically played an important role
in custody disputes in Virginia. ' 56 However, Virginia's 2003 ban on the
use of mental health records or testimony against a parent in a child custody
proceeding greatly altered the application of this exception. 57 It states, in
relevant part, that "in any case in which custody or visitation of a minor
child is at issue pursuant to [Virginia Code section] 20-124.2... the records
concerning a parent, kept by any licensed mental health care provider and
any information obtained during or from therapy shall be privileged and
'58
confidential.
There is an exception that allows admission of mental health evidence by
46. Brown v. Brown, 30 Va. App. at 538; 518 S.E.2d at 338 (emphasis added).
47. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:8, at 1106 (citing Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688, 693; 292
S.E.2d 352, 354 (1982)). Despite the court's reference to the outdated tender years presumption, the
rationale for awarding custody to one parent based on the other parent's unfitness remains relevant. Id.
at 1106 n.28.
48. Id. at 1106 (citing Moore v. Moore, 212 Va. 153, 156, 183 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1971)).
49. Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 200, 237 S.E.2d 89, 92 (Va. 1977)).
50. Id. at 1106-07 (citing Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 690-91; 179 S.E.2d 461, 462-63 (Va. 1971)).
51. Id. at 1110-12 (citing Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 747; 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Va. 1981); Bottoms v.
Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 420, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995)).
52. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:8, at 1115 (referencing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(9) (Repl.
Vol. 2004)).
53. See id at 1118-19.
54. See id.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007).

56. Katherine C. Dewart, Note, A Privilegefor "Mommy Dearest"? Criticizing Virginia's Mental Health
Records Privilege in Custody Disputes and the Court'sApplication in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1341, 1341 (2006) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Supp. 2005)).
57. See id at 1341-42.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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59
court order in cases involving suspicions of an abused or neglected child.
The ban does not supersede the mandatory reporting requirements regarding
abused or neglected children. 60 The purpose of these exceptions is to
further promote the best interests of the child, 61 however critics argue they
are not broad enough to fully encompass that tenet. 62 Another way in
which therapist testimony can be admitted is if the parent in therapy
provides advance written consent. 63 In consent cases, the testimony is still
"limited to the custody and or visitation case in question, but in such event
the provider's records and notes regarding that parent are made
admissible. '64 Ironically, however, the likelihood of the patient-parent
giving consent is decreased in cases where disclosure may be the most

necessary.
B. Disadvantages of Allowing Therapist Testimony
1. Compromising the Therapy Process
Critics of repealing the ban contend that any information disclosed
during therapy sessions should not be admissible in a court proceeding
because allowing such information to be disclosed in court abuses the
therapy process: 65 "[P]sychologist Thomas DeMaio said repealing the law
would undermine the trust that clients must have in their
psychotherapists. ' 66 Dr. DeMaio also distinguished therapy from judicial
determinations, noting that "treating psychologists are eliciting information
that will help change the behavior of the client, a very different effort than
evaluating the client's fitness as a parent. ' 67 Dr. DeMaio's argument is
flawed. First, he seems to suggest therapists counsel their clients to change
their behaviors in a manner inconsistent with being a parent capable of
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100 (Repl.
Vol. 2007).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2007); see also id. § 63.2-1509 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
61. See VA CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (listing various factors a trial court should consider when deciding
the best interests of the child in a custody and visitation case).
62. See Alan Cooper, Law BarringTherapist's Testimony Is Extended, VA. LAW WKLY., Jan. 8, 2007,
at 1, 18 [hereinafter Cooper, Law Extended]. Parental behavior that does not rise to the level of abuse or
neglect can still reflect on a parent's ability to promote the best interests of the child and yet can go
unreported. See Alan Cooper, Ban on Therapist Testimony in Custody Cases Remains: Bill to Repeal
2002 Law Fails,VA. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 29, 2007 at 1, 22 [hereinafter Cooper, Ban Remains].
63. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:8, at 1095 (referencing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Repl.
Vol. 2007)).
64. Id.
65. See Cooper, Ban Remains, supranote 62, at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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providing for the best interests of the child. Second, Dr. DeMaio presumes
the parent's interest in confidentiality is more important than a proper
determination of the best interests of the child.
The basis of the confidentiality argument points out the purpose of
therapy is to develop a trusting relationship with a therapist, thereby
allowing the patient to feel safe to make any necessary disclosures without
fear of this information being later released. 68 Some therapists fear if the
69
ban is repealed, it will impact their ability to properly treat their patients.
Accordingly, ninety-eight percent of the Virginia Society of Clinical
Psychologists continue to support the ban: 70 "[if] you're a mental health
therapist, confidentiality and the trust that goes with it are essential in the
treatment of your clients. ' 71 However, this objection also presupposes that
a parent's right to confidentiality takes precedence over determining the
best interests of the child. These arguments clearly demonstrate the tension
between the mental health care professionals responsible for enacting this
ban and domestic relations attorneys who wish to present all the evidence
possible "to help a judge decide what type of custody is in the best interests
'72
of a child."
2. Latent Gender Discrimination
Proponents of the ban argue repealing it inadvertently discriminates
against mothers "because women seek therapy three or four times as often
as men." 73 While it is important Virginia custody law is facially gender
neutral, there is simply no hard evidence to support this fear of gender
discrimination. The fact that mothers are more likely to seek therapy than
fathers does not necessarily imply a mother will make damning statements
about her ability to parent in therapy. Additionally, these statistics do not
show women are more likely to be mentally ill, just that they are more
likely to seek counseling. 74 An assumption that women are more likely to
be mentally ill seems to be gender discrimination.
During the 2007 committee sessions discussing proposed Senate Bill
737, Benjamin M. Schutz, a forensic psychologist, stated that "he knows of
nothing other than speculation to suggest that parents don't get mental

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Cooper, Ban Remains, supranote 62, at 1, 22.
See id.at 22.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 22.
See id.
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health treatment because they fear that... their therapy records will be used
against them in custody proceedings. '75 Dr. Schutz posits, if anything, "the
opposite is true. A parent who has a problem and is getting treated for it
looks better to a judge than one who is in denial. ' 76 A parent who seeks
therapy and exhibits a desire to address any issues he or she might have
illustrates a self-awareness and desire to be the best possible parent. 77 In
fact, many attorneys and experts advise their clients to seek counseling
whether it be to learn how to effectively co-parent or to have someone with
78
whom to discuss the divorce process.

3. Possible recrimination
Others argue a parent-patient should be open in therapy without fear of
79
things said being later held against him or her during court proceedings.
Proponents of the ban "also argue that therapy for the parent is beneficial to
the family as a whole. ' 80 They argue, if potential disclosure of information
gained in therapy during court proceedings "discourages the parent from
seeking mental health treatment, the children, as well as the parents, are
injured by the lack of a privilege." 81 Proponents ironically point to the
Virginia Code's requirement that a court must consider a parent's mental
health as evidence therapy could be held against a parent in a custody
proceeding. 82 However, this argument is flawed because the statute
codifies the basic principle that the parent who can best provide for the best
interests of the child should be awarded custody. 83 A parent's mental
health is a valid factor, relevant in Virginia custody law, to determine if that
parent is capable of providing for a child's best interests. 84 Consideration
of this factor is not recrimination against the parent but rather recognition
that the child's best interests are paramount to a parent's privilege of
confidentiality.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. NICHOLAS LONG & REX FOREHAND, MAKING DIVORCE EASIER ON YOUR CHILD: 50 EFFECTIVE
WAYS TO HELP CHILDREN ADJuST 192-93 (McGraw-Hill 2002); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN AND SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, WHAT ABOUT THE KIDS? RAISING YOUR CHILDREN BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER

DIVORCE 166, 200, 211-12, 256 (Hyperion Books 1st ed. 2003).
79. See Cooper, Ban Remains, supranote 62, at 22.
80. Dewart, supra note 56, at 1346 (citing Marjorie Fine Knowles & Caroline Chunn McCarthy,
Parents,Psychologists and Child Custody Disputes: Protectingthe Privilege and the Children, 37 ALA.
L. REV. 391, 411 (1986)).
81. Id.
82. VA. CODE ANN. &20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
83. Id.; see also SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:1, at 1053.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3; see also SWISHERET AL., supra note 1, § 15:1, at 1053.
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4. Probative value of evidence obtained
Another argument supporting the ban concerns the evidence's probative
value.85 It is argued that "because patients may be suffering from severe
mental health diseases, they often have a distorted sense of reality, and the
revelations they make to their therapists may be inaccurate," thereby calling
into question this evidence's probative value to the court. 86 This argument
is flawed because it assumes patients lie to their therapists while in the same
breath proposing that the therapy process is a sanctuary for honesty.
Additionally, if the therapist believes that the patient is lying, either
intentionally or due to a skewed perception of the world, the therapist
would have the opportunity to testify to this fact. The judge would be able
to make a decision in the best interests of the child based on all of the
information.
C. Advantages of Allowing Therapist Testimony
The Virginia ban has been at the center of much debate. 87 The ban was
codified in 2003 after a big lobbying push by mental health professionals. 88
The 2007 Virginia General Assembly defeated a proposed bill to repeal the
ban and allow therapist participation. 89 However, Senator Frank Quayle
proposed an identical bill to the 2008 General Assembly, which passed and
repealed the ban. 9
Repealing the ban will help to resolve current conflicting case law that
reflects the difficulty Virginia courts have experienced in applying the ban.
In Bullano v. Bullano, the Virginia Court of Appeals allowed testimony of a
therapist against a party in an equitable determination hearing; however, the
decision did not extend the application of this exception to custody
disputes. 91 Virginia is an equitable distribution state, so when parties
divorce, the court divides property between the parties based upon the
concept "both spouses contribute to the economic status of a marriage by
85. See DEWART, supranote 56, at 1346.
86. Id. (citing Catharina J.H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-ClientTestimonial Privilege:
Defining the ProfessionalInvolved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 802-03 (1985)).
87. See Cooper, Ban Remains, supranote 62, at 1, 22.
88. Cooper, Law Extended, supranote 62, at 1.
89. See
Legislative
Information
Services,
Bill
Tracking:
SB737,
2007
Session,
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-binlegp504.exe?071+sum+SB737 (last visited March 14, 2008). See S.B.
569, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
90. S.B. 330, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
91. Bullano v. Bullano, No. 5077-06-2, 2007 WL 216331, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Jan., 30, 2007); see also
Deborah Elkins, Therapist Testimony Can Come infor ED, Support, VA. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 5, 2007, at

1,22.
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monetary contributions or non-monetary contributions such as homemaking
services. ' 92 Allowing therapist testimony in the determination of other
domestic relations issues, such as equitable distribution, but not in custody
cases, presents an unfair contradiction. A judge has the benefit of taking all
factors into consideration when dealing with property in an equitable
distribution situation, and yet in a custody case, the judge has limited
knowledge. Can it truly be said limited knowledge is acceptable when
determining the best interests of the child?
Another troubling case is Woodell v. Amherst County Department of
Social Services, in which the court held expert therapist testimony was
properly admitted because the ban was only applicable in custody cases, not
93
in those cases having to do with the termination of parental rights.
Allowing therapist testimony in termination of parental rights cases allows
a judge to have all of the information to determine the best interests of the
child, rather than placing a greater value on a parent's right to
confidentiality.
Virginia courts repeatedly restate the principle "the welfare of the infant
is the primary, paramount, and controlling consideration of the court in all
controversies between parents over the custody of their minor children. All
other matters are subordinate. ' 94
Therefore, the confidentiality of a
parent's relationship with a therapist should be subordinate to the best
interests of the child.
To add to the confusion, in the recent case of Rice v. Rice, the court held
the ban was extended to exclude testimony about the child. 95 This ruling
was in conjunction with Schwartz v. Schwartz.96 Not only is relevant
testimony related to the parent's capability of providing for the best
interests of the child excluded, but also any insight a therapist has about the
child. 97 In Rice, the court did not allow the therapist's testimony, holding,
under Schwartz, section 20-124.3:1 of the Virginia Code bans the therapist
testimony in this case because she "was hired by the mother and called to

92. SWISHER ET AL., supranote 1, §11:1, at 553.
93. Woodall v. Amherst Co. Dept. of Soc. Serv., CH5010240, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 269, at *7 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2005).
94. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 15:8, at 1092 (quoting Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 269, 49 S.E.
2d 349, 354 (Va. 1948)). This standard has been applied to child custody cases repeatedly by the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. See e.g., Keel v. Keel, 225 Va. 606, 610, 303 S.E.2d 917, 920
(Va. 1983) (holding that the welfare of the child is of primary importance); Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va.
689,690, 179 S.E.2d 461, 462 ( Va. 1971) (noting that the controlling consideration is welfare of
children); Campbell v. Campbell, 203 Va. 61, 63, 122 S.E.2d 658, 660 (Va. 1961).
95. Rice v. Rice, 49 Va. App. 192, 195, 200, 638 S.E.2d 702, 704, 706 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
96. 46 Va. App. 145, 616 S.E.2d 59 (2005); see Rice, 49 Va. App. at 200, 638 S.E.2d at 706.
97. Rice, 49 Va. App. at 200, 638 S.E.2d at 706.
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testify by the grandparents... on behalf of or against one or other of the
parents or an adult relative of either parent (i.e. the grandparents), since
they are all parties to the dispute. ' 98 The Rice court pointed out nothing in
the language of the statutory ban required the parent must have been a
patient in order to invoke the privilege. 99 However, the dissent felt the
court was misapplying the ban, stating the law "prohibits a mental health
care provider who has been engaged to counsel a child from testifying about
the child's parents and their adult relatives, but not from testifying about the
child him-or herself." 100 In Rice, the therapist's testimony consisted of
information strictly regarding the diagnosis and progress of the minor child
and "would not have included statements about the parents or their adult
relatives." 10 1 Rice extended the application of the ban, further limiting the
amount of information a judge can access in making custody
determinations.
Psychologists who act as custody evaluators perform a valuable service
to judges in custody disputes. 10 2 Attorneys and psychologists alike agree
custody evaluators are an important resource:
Psychology is in a position to make significant contributions to child
custody decisions. Psychological data and expertise, gained through a child
custody evaluation, can provide an additional source of information and an
additional perspective not otherwise readily available to the court on what
appears to be in a child's best interests, and thus can increase the fairness of
103
the determination the court must make.
If a strict interpretation of the ban is used, these valuable experts could
be prohibited from testifying in any manner that provided negative feedback
about a parent.
Lastly, Virginia law lists the mental health of a parent as a factor a judge
must consider in deciding custody.10 4 Proponents of repealing the ban and
child advocates point to the Virginia Code itself for support:
Robert E. Shepherd, a retired University of Richmond law professor and
a longtime advocate for the rights of children, emphasized that state law
lists the mental health of a parent as one of the factors a judge must

98. Id. at 199-200, 638 S.E.2d at 706.

99. Id.
100. Id at 207, 638 S.E.2d at 710 (Clements, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 209, 638 S.E.2d at 711 (Clements, J., dissenting).
102. Guidelinesfor Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677,
677 (1994).

103. Id.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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consider in deciding custody. It makes no sense for another law to make
that information inadmissible. 105
The ban is disliked by many practicing attorneys who feel it limits their
ability to present a complete case. Lawrence D. Diehl, 10 6 a noted Virginia
attorney, has stated "[j]udges need all the evidence they can get to
determine just what is in the best interests of a child during custody and
visitation disputes... [since k]eeping information from judges does not help
in that effort." 10 7 Practicing attorneys need to present the evidence that best
supports their case, including testimony of mental health professionals. By
tying the hands of family law practitioners, the ban keeps them from
providing the best representation possible to their clients.
IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the ban on therapist testimony in custody determinations
is flawed and has few redeeming qualities. The ban is not in keeping with
Virginia's best interests of the child standard. The objections to repealing
the ban are misguided because they conflict with the prime objective of
custody determinations-promoting the best interests of the child.
Proponents of the ban seek more to protect a parents' right to privacy,
mental health professionals from liability, or the integrity of the therapy
process. These interests are secondary to the best interests of the child in
custody determinations. It is clearly stated in Virginia law that the mental
health of the parent is a factor that judges must take into consideration in
making custody determinations; accordingly, judges should have access to
mental health professionals to aid them in making these decisions. The
2008 General Assembly has taken a large step in Virginia custody law
towards achieving a more inclusive approach at determining what
constitutes the best interests of the child by allowing all information,
including therapist testimony, to be taken into consideration.

105. Cooper, Ban Remains, supranote 62, at 1, 22.
106. Lawrence D. Diehl, Esquire is a partner at Barnes & Diehl, P.C., the largest family law firm in the
state of Virginia, and has consistently been listed as one of "The Best Lawyers in America, 'Family
Law."' Barnes & Diehl, P.C., Attorney's & Counselors at Law: Attorneys, Lawrence D. Diehl,
http://www.thebameslawfirm.com/Bio/LawrenceDiehl.asp.
107. Cooper, Law Extended, supranote 62, at 18.
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